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Technology Transfer to Developing
Nations: A Pragmatic Approach to
Industrialization
INTRODUCTION
The international transfer of technology has been dominated by
a small group of technologically advanced states since the beginning
of the Industrial Revolution.' These industrialized nations, which
produce almost all scientific and technological advances,2 have sup-
plied them to the "less developed countries" (LDCs) 3 on terms that
were subject to negotiation with regard not only to compensation,
but also to the control of intellectual property rights, including
patents, trademarks, trade secrets and know-how. National laws
of the host country often regulate technology transfers' through
restrictions, such as limits on royalty payments and terms of pat-
ents and trademarks. In the past, the restrictions were often waived
contractually or through special legislation because the technology
was badly needed and otherwise unavailable.
Aided by these waivers and encouraged by the possibility of
exploiting the often vast natural resources of the host, businesses
1. Ledakis, Evolving Technology Transfer, 1978 LEs NouvELLE 255, 256. Advanced
states will be referred to throughout this paper as "developed" or "industrialized."
2. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, TEC NOLOGY TwRsAvzi AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
14 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPING COUNTRIES].
3. The term "developing countries" has often been applied to those nations which had
been colonized by the Western world. Generally, the "developing countries" have only re-
cently been afforded independence.
It is interesting to note that Mexico, which has been an independent nation for many
years, and Canada, which is considerably more advanced than most Third World nations,
both categorize themselves as industrially and economically "lesser developed." Many na-
tions are developed in some areas and not in others. Whipple, Business View of Mexico Laws,
1978 LEs NouvELu~s 155, 157.
4. Fund for Multinational Management Education, Conclusion, in TECHNOLOGY TRANS-
An mD DEVELOPMENT 295, 296 (R. Driscoll & H. Wallender, III eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as TECHNOLOGY TRANSFE].
Technology has been "defined as the knowledge necessary for the productive functioning
of an enterprise . . . [including] process (engineering), management, marketing, and pro-
duction know-how." The transfer of technology "takes place when [it] is transmitted, re-
ceived, and applied. Transfer is generally a voluntary act by the technology owner .... "
The transfer "can occur through various mechanisms, such as licenses, direct investment,
joint ventures, [and] technical assistance . . . contracts." Fund for Multinational Manage-
ment Education, Council of the Americas, United States Council of the International Cham-
ber of Commerce & The George Washington University, Preface, in 2 PUBLIC POLICY AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 1, 5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRY CHARACTRFISTICS].
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within the industrialized countries 5 expanded into the Third World
nations and grew into the "multinational corporations" (MNCs)
which dominate international technology transfers today.6
Through their growing contacts with Western business and cul-
ture, the LDCs have become aware of, and increasingly dissatisfied
with, the widening gap between their standards of living and those
of the industrialized nations.7 As their level of economic sophistica-
tion has grown, they have begun to realize that the acquisition of
the advanced technical and scientific knowledge and -skills pos-
sessed by the developed world is vital to their desired commercial
growth and to the achievement of economic independence.
The LDCs have examined the present system of international
laws regulating technology transfers which, until recently, has been
primarily the product of commerce among the developed nations.
They have concluded that the pattern of business transactions regu-
lated by the existing laws is detrimental to their interests.'
Conditions imposed contractually on the recipient of technol-
ogy, such as export restrictions, required grantbacks, price con-
trols, tie-ins and overbilling for primary and intermediary materi-
als,' 0 have led LDCs to conclude that although they need and have
benefited from the imported technology, the prices they have been
paying are exhorbitant." As a result, they are seeking revision of the
5. These businesses are chiefly based in the United States, Western Europe and Japan.
DVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 1. See also Fund for Multinational Management
Education, Council of the Americas, United States Council of the International Chamber of
Commerce & The George Washington University, in 1 PUBLmC Poucv AND TECHNOLOGY TRANS-
FEE 48 (1978).
One hundred and twenty corporations were involved in "reviewing and assessing policies
on technology development and transfer." DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 2. Among
the "supporting background materials are 70 industry case histories and the impact of govern-
mental constraints and incentives on them." Id. at 3. The entire project was an attempt to
present "the practical viewpoints of U.S. suppliers of technology." Id. at 4.
6. One of the stated aims for revising the Paris Convention is recognition of the fact "that
individual enterprises had no longer an unestricted right to fix the conditions of transfer of
technology." WIPO, AD Hoc GROUP or GOVERNMENTAL Expzmrs ON THE REvISION OF THE PARIS
CONvENTION 9 (1975) [hereinafter cited as AD Hoc GRoup].
7. DEVEoPiNG CouNTIes, supra note 2, at 1.
8. Gugliotta, Roundtable on Foreign Direct Investment and Technology, in TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFm AND DvELmPMNT 8, 8 (R. Driscoll & H. Wallender, Ill eds. 1975).
9. B. MENON, GLOBAL DIALOGUE 2 (1977).
10. Fund for Multinational Management Education, Historical Perspectives, in TECH-
NOLOGY TRANSFE AND DvELOPMmENr 1, 3 (R. Driscoll & H. Wallender, III eds. 1975). See
Finnegan, A Code of Conduct Regulating International Technology Transfer: Panacea or
Pitfall, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 71 (1978) for definitions of grantback at 94, tie-in at 85, export
restrictions at 91, and price-fixing at 88.
11. Gugliotta, supra note 8, at 11.
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international legal system, 2 implementing national legislation, and
forming coalitions, such as the "group of 77, '13 in their effort to
eliminate practices which they define as "abuses."' 4
These attempts at revision arise at a time when the developed
countries are increasingly concerned that "[technology is being
transferred too freely.""' Some developed nations fear "a loss to the
strategic and/or economic position of that developed country" from
technology transfer," and are therefore advocating strict control
over the exportation of technology. 7
These fundamentally opposed viewpoints have led to a series of
international debates, conferences and proposed changes in current
business practices."
HISTORY OF CONFERENCES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
In response to the LDC demands, the United Nations General
Assembly passed a resolution calling for a United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)." The first meeting
took place at Geneva in 1964 and was followed by three other meet-
ings at New Delhi in 1968, Santiago in 1972, and Nairobi in 1976."
The recommendations and proposals in the Final Reports of the
four conferences differ little. They call on the developed world for
assistance in the form of financial and technical aid and termination
12. Id. at 8.
13. The "group of 77," which was organized in the last 15 years, is a technology transfer
"economic alliance" involving 102 nations of the developing world. Tabor, Technology and
the Developing World, 1975 Las Nouvz as 216, 216. See Finnegan, supra note 10, at 72 n.4.
14. DEvuiO PG CouiNrmm, supra note 2, at 1, 12.
15. Wallender, M1, Conflict in International Transfer, 1977 Las NouvzExEs 68, 68.
16. Hoelscher & Hummon, Policies Affecting Technology Transfer, 1977 Las NOUVELLES
80, 81.
17. Id.
18. See notes 19-101 infra and accompanying text.
19. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was organized in 1962
pursuant to a United Nations General Assembly Resolution. Its first meeting was held in
Geneva in 1964. Since that time three more meetings have been held, with a fifth meeting to
be held in 1979. The goal of these conferences has been the improvement of the status of Third
World nations. Gugliotta, supra note 8, at 8.
20. See generally I Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and pevelop-
ment, Final Act and Report, U.N. Doc. E CONF.46/141, Vol. 1 (1964) (Geneva); I Proceedings
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Report and Annexes, U.N.
Doc. TD/97, Vol. I (1968) (New Delhi); I Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, Report and Annexes, U.N. Doc. TD/180, Vol. 1 (1973) (Santiago); I
Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Report and An-
nexes, U.N. Doc. TD/218 (Vol. I) (1977) (Nairobi).
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of trade barriers against imports from developing countries.' The
LDCs are encouraged to diversify their economies, increase their
exports to developed countries, and thereby improve the balance of
payments problems that most of them face.Y
The Final Reports encourage integration of LDC economies,
23
which has been accomplished to some extent through the establish-
ment of pacts, such as the Andean Pact in Latin America."4 The
LDCs are urged to seek technology which will lead to exports, rather
than mere substitution of domestic products for those which were
previously imported."
The majority of recommendations in UNCTAD I were aimed
at securing the cooperation and assistance of the developed coun-
tries. While acknowledging that private investment is of great im-
portance,2 the conference recommended that technical and finan-
cial aid should come directly from the governments of the developed
countries. Some of the specific recommendations included debt re-
scheduling, the earmarking of aid for specific programs, increasing
technical assistance tailored to individual LDC needs, the establish-
ment of capital markets" within developed countries, and the facili-
tation of the process of technology transfer, including the implemen-
tation of international agreements, legislation and the creation of
United Nations facilities for information exchanges.2
UNCTAD IH made many of the same recommendations, but
the emphasis shifted from attempting to obtain financial aid toward
stimulating the transfer of technology. The need for LDCs to de-
velop their own scientific-technological capabilities was given con-
siderable attention.31
The continuing talks led to increased awareness of the complex-
ity of the issues involved with technology transfer, such as the ap-
propriateness of the technology to the host country,32 the need for
21. Gugliotta, supra note 8, at 12.
22. Id. at 12-13.
23. Id. at 13.
24. See notes 102-06 infra and accompanying text.
25. Gugliotta, supra note 8, at 14.
26. UNCTAD I was held in Geneva in 1964. Id. at 8.
27. Id. at 15.
28. A "capital market" is a data bank with information on investors and amounts of
available capital within a country for technology transfer.
29. Gugliotta, supra note 8, at 15-17.
30. UNCTAD II, a continuation of UNCTAD I, was held at New Delhi in 1968. Id. at 8.
31. Id. at 21.
32. "Appropriate Technology" A Once-Controversial Idea Gains Respectability, 26 Bus.
INT'L 19, 22 (1979) [hereinafter cited as "Appropriate Technology"].
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LDCs to provide environments conducive to the transfer of technol-
ogy3 and the need to create a comprehensive international legal
system regulating intellectual property.
3'
The suggestion that centers be created to disseminate informa-
tion on the availability of technology and the facilitation of its
transfer first appeared in the UNCTAD II Final Report.35 The estab-
lishment of these centers, where representatives of LDCs could for-
mulate plans for their industrial development prior to any purchase
of technology could be of great assistance in the extensive planning
which is essential to controlled industrialization and economic
growth. As a basic minimum, these data banks should contain de-
scriptions of available technology, lists of possible suppliers and
inventors, a survey of economic and technological status and a
projection of the host country's developmental goals.
In addition, UNCTAD II recommended that transferor govern-
ments facilitate technology transfers by ending restrictions on the
use of the information transferred." The United States, in particu-
lar, imposes heavy limitations on the re-exportation of technology
or products from a transferee to certain countries which are consid-
ered unfriendly. These restrictions on re-exportation have been
widely criticized because they prevent the recipient from entering
a vast portion of the export market."
The hope that the recommendations of UNCTAD I and II
would be implemented and would accelerate the industrialization
of the LDCs has not been realized. In evaluating the present eco-
nomic status of the Third World, UNCTAD III cited the unfortun-
ate fact that LDCs economic conditions had deteriorated relative to
the developed world." The Third World concern that the MNCs
were controlling most technology transfer was expressed in the Final
Report.-" The report concluded that "[tihe conference recognizes
33. Gugliotta, supra note 8, at 22.
34. Id. at 19-24.
35. Id. at 22. One such example is the restriction that the United States imposes on
recipients not to transfer products or technology considered to be sensitive to certain unfa-
vored nations (including most of the communist nations).
36. Id. at 23.
37. See generally Note, Export Controls-A National Security Standard, 12 VA. J. INT'L
L. 92 (1971); Address by Lord Hacking, The Increasing Extra-Territorial Impact of U.S.
Laws: A Cause for Concern Amongst Friends of America, Los Angeles County Bar Association
(June 27, 1978).
38. Gugliotta, supra note 8, at 24-27. UNCTAD II was held during 1972 in Santiago,
Chile.
39. Id. at 24-25.
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that the results of the conference have in many cases fallen short of
expectations."
40
The meeting of UNCTAD IV41 at Nairobi in 1976, which itself
directed substantial attention to technology transfer, went on to
schedule yet another conference focused almost exclusively on tech-
nology transfer and the problems of development. 4 The goal of the
developing countries, as set forth in the Final Report of UNCTAD
IV, is: "1) To restructure the legal environment for technology
transfer, and 2) To strengthen the technological capacity of develop-
ing countries in order to reduce their technological dependence.
' '4
1
B. World Intellectual Property Organization
In 1970, the United Nations set up the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO) to promote the "[pirotection of intellec-
tual property throughout the world.""
WIPO's initial efforts have been aimed at both the revision of
the international legal system to facilitate the acquisition of tech-
nology by LDCs and the provision of information to LDCs, which is
vital to their use of the existing system.'5
In August 1977, WIPO published a licensing guide for develop-
ing countries which includes: a description of the present legal sys-
tem; specific information which can be used as a guide to contract
negotiation; legal issues which commonly arise in contract matters,
along with suggestions for dealing with them; and a list of contract
provisions which may be detrimental to the LDC, with suggestions
for possible alternative provisions.
4
1
WIPO is currently working on a new Model Law for use in
updating national patent laws to aid LDCs in achieving their gen-
eral economic aims. Part III of the Model Law contains a "legal and
administrative framework for the examination and registration" of
contracts dealing with technology transfer in the form of patents
40. Id. at 27.
41. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 13.
42. Two major United Nations conferences have been scheduled for 1979. UNCTAD V
is scheduled to meet in Manila, "while the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for
Development. . . is set for late summer in Vienna." "Appropriate Technology", supra note
32, at 22.
43. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 13.
44. McAuliffe, Prospects for Improved Protection of Trademark in International Trade,
61 TRADEMARK REP. 82, 82 (1971).
45. Ledakis, supra note 1, at 262.
46. See WIPO, LICENSING GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1977).
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and know-how."7 In order to qualify for registration under the Model
Law a contract must be free of nineteen restrictive clauses which
WIPO feels are abusive. If a host country believes that the benefits
of the contract justify inclusion of any of these clauses, it may ap-
prove the contract.'8
WIPO is currently preparing an LDC guide for establishing a
system of evaluation and registration of technology transfer con-
tracts.' Current international transfer of patents and trademarks is
controlled largely by the Paris Convention. 50
In 1975, the WIPO ad hoc group of governmental experts met
in Geneva to attempt to revise the Convention. 5' Signatories to the
Convention have agreed to the national treatment of patents held
by aliens of other signatory states.2 One stated objective of the
Convention is the inclusion of preferential treatment without reci-
procity for developing countries in all fields of international eco-
nomic activity, with special reference to patent systems.5 3 A second
objective is more extensive cooperation between members of the
international community to ensure both prosperity and participa-
tion in the benefits of modern technology to LDCs.51 The state-by-
state comments are clear indications of the vast differences in goals
that are represented within the ad hoc group.
It was noted that only 1 percent of the patents held worldwide
are owned by developing country nationals, resulting in a virtual
monopoly by the developed world.ss Further, the owners of the tech-
47. Ledakis, supra note 1, at 262.
48. See generally WIPO, Permanent Legal-Technical Program for Acquisition by Devel-
oping Countries of Technology Related to Industrial Property, U.N. Doc. AT/PCII-I2.1 (1975).
49. Ledakis, supra note 1, at 263-64.
50. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as revised
Dec. 14, 1900 (Brussels), June 2, 1911 (Washington), Nov. 6, 1925 (The Hague), June 2, 1934
(London), Oct. 31, 1958 (Lisbon), July 14, 1967 (Stockholm), [19701 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S.
No. 6923, [19731 24 U.S.T., 2140, T.I.A.S. No. 7727 [hereinafter cited as Convention].
51. AD Hoc GROUP, supra note 6, at 1.
52. National treatment requires that signatory nations treat nationals of other signatory
nations equal to their own nationals in the granting of patents and trademarks. Convention,
supra note 50, art. 2. See generally AD Hoc GROUP, supra note 6, at 2.
53. A patent is the exclusive right to use, or to license others to use, an invention for a
limited time. It is granted to the inventor in return for his publication of a detailed description
of the invention, including methods of production or use of the process. Without the patent
this information would otherwise remain secret. Access to this information allows other inven-
tors to refine or to improve the invention, thereby stimulating innovation. Address by Luc
Benoit, Chairman, Committee on Technology Transfer of the Los Angeles County Bar Asso-
ciation (Jan. 20, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Luc Benoit].
54. AD Hoc GRouP, supra note 6, at 2.
55. Id.
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nology were accused of abusive practices which are viewed as harm-
ful by developing countries. The Convention prescribes waiting
periods during which signatories may not use patented inventions.
In rationalizing the use of patented inventions prior to the expira-
tion of the prescribed period, the delegation from India cited the
need to ensure the public welfare. It also favored licenses of right
57
which could be used if patents were not adequately worked by their
owners."
According to the delegation from Brazil, 80 percent of all pat-
ents granted in developing countries are issued to nonnationals, of
which 90 percent are unworked. The Brazilian delegation believes
that these are unworked because they were obtained merely to pre-
vent any possible use of the technology by competitors in the host
country. It was not reported what percent of the patents owned by
nationals are unworked. Brazil attacked "national treatment" as a
"reverse system of preference to the disadvantage of developing
countries.""
The Mexican delegation attacked the Convention as being so
outdated as to have no validity with regard to the developing coun-
tries. In advocating revisions to provide for preferential treatment
for developing nations, Mexico pointed out that national treatment
of patents and trademarks between the developed and developing
nations results in unequal treatment because of the inherent differ-
ences in technological ability."
Several delegations, including Israel and the represented So-
cialist countries,6 ' suggested that alternative forms of intellectual
property rights, such as inventor's certificates and protection for
employee inventions, be developed and included in the revised Con-
vention.Y
Cuba recommended that trademarks be subject to cancellation
56. Id. The abusive practices they are accused of include underworking or nonworking
of patentswhich results in the patented article being produced exclusively outside the coun-
try, and requiring "grantbacks" of new technology, which do not permit the recipient-
developer use of the new technology without paying the supplier for it.
57. A license of right is a compulsory license granted to anyone seeking it to produce the
patented process or device. Vedaraman, Patent Law in India as a Means Toward Accelerating
Industrial Development, in WIPO WORLD SYMPOSIUM ON -am IMPoirrANcE OF THE PATmT
SYsEM TO DEVELOPING CouNTrmxs 137, 144 (1977).
58. AD Hoc GROUP, supra note 6, at 3.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id. at 4, 6-7.
62. Id. at 7.
[Vol. 2
Technology Transfer
for nonwork.6 In making this suggestion, Cuba failed to acknowl-
edge that trademarks are issued not only to protect the trademark
owner, but also to protect the public by ensuring that a product
carrying that trademark was produced by the specific manufacturer
associated in the public mind with that mark."
The French delegation supported maintenance of the Conven-
tion, although it acknowledged that the virtual monopoly by devel-
oped nations could perhaps be corrected through international
agreements. Its members expressed the fear that "removal of the
[existing international] patent law would ultimately stop the dis-
semination of technology.""
The delegations from the United States and the United King-
dom joined France in strongly supporting the Convention, particu-
larly with respect to trade between industrialized countries. They
viewed the end of the national treatment of patents as certain to
adversely affect international trade."
The delegation from Japan viewed the Convention as a stimu-
lus to both the importation of foreign and the development of do-
mestic technology. In support of this position, it noted that Japan's
accession to the Convention in 1899, before that state had begun to
develop, had "contributed considerably to the industrial develop-
ment of Japan."' '
Nine international "non-governmental organizations were rep-
resented by observers."" UNCTAD favored revision to resolve nu-
merous conflicts over "the national treatment principle, inventors'
certificates, priority, independence of patents, compulsory licenses,
provisions on trademarks and appellations of origin.""
In opposing any fundamental changes to the Convention, the
representative of EIRMA" pointed out that technology suppliers
were already burdened with the high cost of development and trans-
fer of technology combined with the risk of transferee competition
63. Id. at .
64. The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Coun-
tries: U.S. Government Comments, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/19, at 42 (1974) [hLreinafter
cited as U.S. Government Comments).
Trademarks merely designate the producer of the product and are in no way monopolistic
in terms of preventing other manufacturers from making competing products.
65. An Hoc GaouP, supra note 6, at 4.
66. Id. at 3-5.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 1.
69. Id. at 9.
70. European Industrial Research Management Association.
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within the transferor's own sales territory. ELRMA cautioned that
patentees might be discouraged from entering foreign markets. It
also stressed the need to encourage domestic companies to develop
their own inventive activities.
7'
Following the comments of the representatives, the WIPO ad
hoc group went on to consider specific legal questions. 2 It was gener-
ally understood that the law regarding nationa treatment would
remain unchanged as between developed countries. The question as
to whether revisions should be made to assist developing countries,
and if so, what those changes should be, remained unsettled." Re-
duced fees for technology, shortened terms for patents, and the
addition of requirements that patents obtained in developing coun-
tries be fully worked were among the possible areas for revision.,,
Areas suggested for future study included nonworking of pat-
ents, compulsory licenses, licenses of right, preferential treatment
of LDCs without reciprocity, technical assistance, types of protec-
tion other than patents, trademarks and industrial designs, and
appellations of origin.7'
C. Other Conferences and Reports
In 1975, UNCTAD, UNDESM and WIPO prepared an analysis
entitled The Role of the Patent in Technology Transfer to Develop-
ing Countries. The report includes descriptions of the international
patent system, national legislation, suggested safeguards against
abuses, and the presumed effect of technology transfer on the eco-
nomic advance of LDCs.7
The United States government states in its comments on the
study that the analysis is biased.7 The United States supports the
establishment of sound patent systems within developing nations
but opposes dilution of economic or other incentives to foreign sup-
pliers of technology as counter to the stated aim of LDCs to become
industrialized, exporting nations.'
71. AD Hoc Gaoup, supra note 6, at 10.
72. Id. at 11.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id, at 12.
76. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
77. UNCTAD, The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to Develop-
ing Countries, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/19/Rev. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Role of the
Patent System].
78. U.S. Government Comments, supra note 64, at 2.
79. Id. at 1.
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A great deal of interest and discussion has been focused on
patent systems as a vehicle for facilitating LDCs industrialization.
Patents, however, are only one aspect of the complex network of
information and know-how which must be present in order for an
economically advantageous transfer of technology to take place.10
The UNCTAD study concentrated a great deal of attention on
the economic impact of patents on developing countries s1 The
United States, in its comments, lists nine important factors which,
although necessary for a sound analysis, are conspicuously absent
from the UNCTAD report. They are as follows:
a. adequacy of country planning
b. lack of indigenous technological infrastructure
c. social and cultural impediments
d. stability of national governments and national attitudes to-
wards technological transfer
e. rigid rules prescribing the form and extent of local participa-
tion in a technological enterprise
f. lack of insurance against expropriation or loss of investment
g. dispersion of markets
h. limitations on venture capital
i. protectionism.n
The United States favors retention of the Convention as a nec-
essary framework for the "orderly meshing of diverse national sys-
tems" and a minimum standard for acceptable international busi-
ness practice. Accession to the Convention has traditionally sig-
naled to the investing community that the country encourages tech-
nology transfer and investment.8
In the 1977 summary proceeding of the Section of Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Law of the American Bar Association,
the section members joined the United States government in
strongly opposing enactment of any laws in contravention of the
Convention as it now stands."
At a 1972 conference in Brasilia (CACTAL) conducted by the
General Secretariat of the Organization of American States (OAS),u
80. Id. at 2.
81. The Role of the Patent System, supra note 77.
82. U.S. Government Comments, supra note 64, at 6-7.
83. Id. at 31.
84. ABA, SECTIoN oF PATENTS, TAMsaRS AND Corm'Hor LAW 14 (A. Jackson, Jr. ed.
1977).
85. The Specialized Conference on the Application of Science and Technology to Latin
American Development (CACTAL). Gugliotta, supra note 8, at 87.
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the application of science and technology to Latin American devel-
opment was studied. The Final Report proposals call for changes
and suggest ways of achieving them. Adaptation of technology to
the needs of the LDC, growth of indigenous research and develop-
ment (R&D) systems, and expanded government regulations and
incentives were regarded as crucial to industrialization. The acquis-
ition of technology was regarded as the most important aspect of
industrial development."
The Brasilia conference added refusal of the transferor to set up
R&D facilities within the host nation to the list of practices consid-
ered by UNCTAD to be abusive.87 In practical terms, it would be
extremely expensive for suppliers to establish R&D centers in every
country to which they transferred technology. It would also result
in wasted effort, duplication and confusion. CACTAL specifically
recommended that LDCs regulate all transfers of technology and
implement regional patent systems." The conference called for in-
creased education and training, combined with economic and other
incentives, to reduce the emigration of the domestic technologists
from LDCs to developed nations,' which offer excellent employ-
ment opportunities. The basic thrust of the conference was to en-
courage use of domestic, rather than foreign, technology. 0 Interest-
ingly, the conference noted that the LDC private sector views im-
ported technology as both superior to, and less expensive than, do-
mestic technology."
The CACTAL conference also urged that Latin American coun-
tries compare prices before purchasing technology,' 2 "[tjrain local
personnel in the use of the imported technology, .. . [rJemove
obstacles to full use of imported technology," 9 and induce importers
to conduct research locally.' One conference objective was to reduce
technological dependence, which was recognized by the conference
to result from weak technical infrastructures." It was recognized
86. Id. at 88.
87. Id. at 89. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
88. Gugliotta, supra note 8, at 89.
89. Id. at 90.
90. Id. at 91.
91. Id. at 89.
92. Id. at 106.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 104-05.
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that overpricing" as well as restrictive trade practices'8 exist, and
the failure to adapt imported technology to local conditions" con-
tributes to this dependence.
The third Round Table on Foreign Private Investment in Latin
America met in Caracas February 13-16, 1973, and urged investors
to provide assistance to educational institutions and to establish
local research facilities. ' °0 The panel concluded that the establish-
ment of a Regional Center for information on international invest-
ments in Latin America should be thoroughly investigated."'
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION
A. Andean Pact
One example of regional legislation is Decision 24 of the Carta-
gena Agreement enacted by the Andean Pact nations.'0 Decision 24
is aimed at decreasing the Andean Pact nations' dependence on
foreign capital and technology through regional control of foreign
investments involving technology transfer.Iu The Andean Foreign
Investment Code (AFIC) seeks to integrate development, while dis-
couraging intra-regional competition for available foreign invest-
ments. ' 0U
The AFIC requires registration of all contracts which involve
technology transfers. It specifically excludes from registration con-
tracts containing restrictive clauses calling for "tie-ins," price set-
ting, limitations on volume production, forced "grantbacks," and
similar devices which are viewed as abusive.105 Under the AFIC,
certain sectors of national economies, including communications,
utilities and financial institutions are reserved exclusively for na-
tional investors.'0
97. Id. at 105.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 88.
100. Id. at 133.
101. Id. at 135.
102. The Cartagena Agreement, May 26, 1969, reprinted in 8 INT'L LwGA MATERIUS 910
(1969). See TECHNOLOGY TNSNa, supra note 4, at 195. The five Andean Pact nations are
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.
103. Fund for Multinational Management Education, The Andean Group: Introduc-
tion, in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND DEVELOPMENT 195, 195 (R. Driscoll v. H. Wallender, III
eds. 1975). See generally McAuliffe, supra note 44, at 92.
104. Borzutsky, Decision 24 of the Cartagena Agreement: Analysis of the Andean Ap-
proach to Technology Transfer, in TCHNOLOGY TRANSPm AND DVmL4onoaPmr 196, 196 (R.
Driscoll & H. Wallender, M eds. 1975).
105. Id. at 197-98.
106. Id. at 199-200.
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Many of the developing countries are implementing national
laws restricting technology transfers. Of laws currently in effect,
those in Mexico, Brazil, India and the Andean Pact are of interest
because they fairly represent the types of changes desired and de-
mands being made by the LDCs.
B. Mexico
Mexico began enacting technology transfer legislation in
1972.'1 Companies with equity more than 51 percent foreign owned
or which are controlled or managed by foreigners are defined as
foreign businesses.' °0 Foreign ownership is generally limited to 49
percent or less of new manufacturing companies and is strictly lim-
ited to no more than 49 percent of mining industries.'"0
Article 23 of the foreign investment law, which became effective
in 1973, sets up a national registry by which all foreign investments
governed by the new law and all Mexican companies with capital
partially held by foreigners must be registered. ' 0 Sanctions for non-
registration include denial of the right to pay dividends,"' invalida-
tion of agreements,"' and possible criminal penalties which include
imprisonment for up to nine years and fines of up to 100,000 pesos. ",
3
Under the new registration procedures, existing companies with
foreign investment must obtain approval before they issue capital
stock increases, enter into a new field of economic activity, open new
facilities or start new product lines. The existing companies may be
forced to Mexicanize if they wish to expand."'
The 1976 Law of Inventions and Trademarks reduces patent
protection to ten years, rather than the previously prescribed
fifteen-year term,"15 and denies patent protection to pharmaceuti-
107. Whipple, supra note 3, at 155. The four recently enacted Mexican laws relating to
patents, trademarks, and technology are:
"1. The 1976 Law of Inventions and Trademarks.
2. The 1973 Law of Foreign Investment.
3. The 1972 Law on Technology Transfer.
4. Laws establishing CONACYT (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Technologia)." Id.
108. F. Laffan, Doing Business in and with Mexico, § I (A) (May 6, 1976) (unpublished
material at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law School Library).
109. Secretaria de Industria y Comercio, reprinted in F. Laffan, supra note 108, Annex
4, at 9.
110. Law on the Promotion of Mexican Investment and the Regulation of Foreign Invest-
ment of May 8, 1973, art. 23, D.O. Mar. 9, 1973, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 648
(1973).
111. Id. art. 27 at 649.
112. Id. art. 28 at 649.
113. Id. art. 29 at 649.
114. F. Laffan, supra note 108, § I.
115. The Law of Inventions and Trademarks of Feb. 10, 1976, art. 40, D.O. Feb. 10,
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cals, fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals, and certain other
products considered to be essential to the basic welfare in the coun-
try."1
6
Although the provisions listed thus far make the importation of
technology more difficult, they would not, in and of themselves,
discourage most prospective investors. However, when combined
with other provisions yet to be reviewed, they become definite deter-
rents.
The 1973 foreign investment law requirement that the Ministry
of Industry and Commerce approve the royalty paid for the technol-
ogy is particularly onerous to business. Generally, the registry will
not approve contracts calling for greater than a 3 percent royalty.
If the technology is not particularly important to the economy, the
percentage authorized has often been limited to as low as 1 percent
of sales. For strongly desired sophisticated technology a higher per-
centage may be authorized." 7
Under the 1973 law, there are six situations in which contracts
must be rejected absolutely. They are:
1) where the technology is already freely available within the
country
2) where "grantbacks," exclusive to the transferor, are in-
cluded
3) where raw materials must be purchased from the techno-
logy supplier
4) where the contract exceeds ten years
5) where restrictions or prohibitions against exporting are
included
6) where the parties agree to settle disputes outside Mexico.,"
The inability to limit exports places businesses that have existing
agreements granting exclusive markets to companies in other coun-
tries or regions in violation of those agreements if they manufacture
in Mexico.
The Law of Inventions and Trademarks provides that patents
which are unused within three years of registration (plus an addi-
tional year of nonexploitation) are subject to cancellation.", Com-
1976 (New Patent and Trade Mark Law in Mexico), reprinted in 2e J. SINNor, WORLD
PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, at Mex. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The Law of Inventions and
Trademarks].
116. Id. art. 10
117. F. Laffan, supra note 108, § II(A).
118. How the Registry is Working, MEX-AM REv. AM. CHAMBER COM.-MEX., March, 1976,
at 12, 13 (interview with Jaime Alvarez Soberanis, Director of the Direccion General Del
Registro Nacional de Transferencia de Technologia [hereinafter cited as MEX-AM REv.I.
119. The Law of Inventions and Trademarks, supra note 115, arts. 41-42, 48.
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pulsory licenses may be granted to anyone requesting them, for any
patents on which work has been suspended for six months or more,
which are underexploiting export markets, or which are unworked
within three years of registration.2' Under this law, the owner of a
patent on which a compulsory license has been granted is required
to supply know-how to the licensees.12' Patents which are needed for
the "public good" may be expropriated.
2
Mexico will not absolutely refuse contracts with export limita-
tions where the supplier has other conflicting exclusive licenses,'1'
but will "look very carefully into other sources of supplies,' ' 2 such
as Japanese or European companies, in an attempt to obtain similar
technology without export restrictions.2
In an exclusive interview, the Director of the Direccion General
Del Registro Nacional de Transferencia de Technologia was asked
whether Mexico had lost any technology due to its restrictive laws.
His reply, that Mexico did not believe it had lost any technology,
was based upon discussions with businessmen in the United States
and Europe and with representatives of international organizations.
The Director took the position that foreign investors know what to
expect and are aware that Mexico honors its commitments.'2 6 How-
ever, there have been indications to the contrary.1'2
In a 1978 article in Les Nouvelles, Robert P. Whipple presented
a personal canvass of American business views that was based on
interviews with eighty-six attorneys who had advised clients on the
use of patents, trademarks and technology in international busi-
ness. He states "[niow, through necessity and not choice, they
relegate Mexico to a last-tier country for consideration as a country
into which technology can be safely transferred.' 21 8 Mr. Whipple
foresees that small and medium sized companies, which often are
the source of practical technology of the kind needed and easily
assimilated by developing countries, will become unwilling to invest
in Mexico as a result of the new restrictions.2'9 It is just this type of
"intermediate technology" which forms the basis for an infrastruc-
120. Id. art. 50.
121. Whipple, supra note 3, at 156.
122. Id. See The Law of Inventions and Trademarks, supra note 115, art. 63.
123. MEx-AM REV., supra note 118, at 15.
124. Aguilar, Criteria for Measuring Cost-Benefits for Foreign Technology, in TECH-
NOLOGY TRANSFER AND DEVELOPMENT 146, 150 (R. Driscoll & H. Wallender, Ill eds. 1975).
125. Id. at 149.
126. MEX-AM REv., supra note 118, at 15.
127. Whipple, supra note 3, at 159.
128. Id. at 155.
129. Id.
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ture and a technology base within the developing country sufficient
to support the indigenous growth and maintenance of major indus-
tries.'10
While "appropriate technology" is being sought by the LDCs,
a conflict often arises within the LDC itself because the country
wants the newest technology available, rather than old established
methods which, although appropriate to the host environment, are
viewed by the LDC as "obsolete." Although there is no precise defi-
nition of the term "appropriate technology," one illustrative exam-
ple is the use of a $100 hand pump in an area where unemployment
is high, rather than a $1,300 diesel pump requiring expensive fuel."'I
The term is generally used to denote technology geared to the needs,
technical ability, existing markets, region of implementation, man-
agement ability, available support network, natural resources and
labor market of the recipient.'
In general, the reaction of business owners who might have
invested in Mexico has been negative. The former Mexican incen-
tives' 33 to business, combined with low labor costs and Mexico's
proximity to the United States, led to heavy United States invest-
ment there. Until 1970, fully 71 percent of total foreign investment
capital came into Mexico from the United States.'3 "Certainly U.S.
companies and the individuals managing them and advising them
see little or no business opportunity in Mexico to attract them.'
' 35
The Whipple article cites the following reactions of United
States business and counsel to the new law:
3
1) A Los Angeles, California, licensing attorney stated "[tihe
net result is that smaller businesses and entrepreneurs simply do
not want to get involved in a situation made more difficult than it
previously was."'
' 37
2) An Orange County, California, lawyer stated "[tjhe royalty
approved by the appropriate agency in Mexico has in my experience
been unrealistically low. Indeed in one case which came across my
desk within the last several days, the reaction of the president of the
130. "Appropriate Technology", supra note 32, at 19.
131. Rosen, Technology Transfer to Developing Nations, 1 J. TECH. TRANSFER 93, 100
(1977).
132. "Appropriate Technology", supra note 118, at 19.
133. These include reductions in import taxes, tax incentives for exports and accelerated
depreciation.
134. F. Laffan, supra note 108, at introduction.
135. Whipple, supra note 3, at 159-60.
136. Id. at 155-60.
137. Id. at 159.
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company involved was in effect that we should forget about Mexico
"'138
3) Two pharmaceutical manufacturers stopped filing patents in
Mexico, although one has a local operation and one a license there.
Low royalties were specifically cited as the basis for their decisions
not to transfer further technology.
I
1
9
4) Counsel from a large corporation said, "if we had not already
entered the Mexican market through substantial investment in that
country, needless to say, we would have thought twice before enter-
ing Mexico as a new market.""10
5) A large industrial products company is no longer willing to
use its trademark on items from manufacturing operations in Mex-
ico because the quality of the product has declined while the price
has risen. A senior executive informed Mr. Whipple that the reasons
for the company's removal of its trademark were the requirements
of trademark linking"' and purchase of components within Mex-
ico.1
42
[Blecause of the laws permitting utilization of that technology in
shipments all over the world, we are not inclined to share the basic
and certainly not the most important technology with people with
whom we deal. . . . [W]e have made efforts in Mexico for the last
20 years and have really made little inroad in establishing a suc-
cessful program, whereas in 17 other countries of the world in the
same period we have increased the total sales of our company by
20%. These kinds of statistics should tell the Mexican authorities
something about the strange and difficult barriers which they have
built with nothing but a view of nationalism in their minds. '4
It has been observed that
[i]f a technology owner sees that a Third World Country is going
to create problems and raise barriers to the transfer of technology,
the source, because it has limited time to devote to this process,
will decide not to transfer to that country and will instead transfer
to other countries that do not have these barriers and problems
138. Id.
139. Id. at 158.
140. Id. at 159.
141. Trademark linking requires that "all foreign owned trademarks which are destined
to cover goods manufactured in Mexico under license or not shall be used in combination with
a trademark originally registered in Mexico." Id. at 156.
142. Id. at 159.
143. Id.
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and that have a more favorable environment for transfer of
technology. "'
That Mexico is attempting to justify its low royalties, forced
licenses and refusal to register contracts with export restrictions is
implicit in its comment that it is industry practice to set the price
for technology at whatever the market will bear."5 This argument
is based on a nonreciprocal right to control price and market, for if
this rationale were applied to all exports, rather than just technol-
ogy transfer, Mexico would not have the right to set the price of its
oil and natural gas at the highest price purchasers are willing or
forced to pay.
"Particularly repugnant" is the Mexican insistence that be-
cause the licensee has paid a royalty for the technology, he therefore
owns it outright." ' American business is "not willing to give away
technology based on years of engineering and know-how experience"
without adequate compensation."7 The overall impact is to discour-
age business from transferring technology into Mexico.'" This is
clearly opposed to the Mexican statement that there will be no
reduction of technology importation due to the new Mexican law. 119
The following case histories of technology suppliers' experiences
in dealing with Mexico's new law will illustrate some of the prob-
lems facing prospective investors.
1) A European MNC, primarily transferring process know-how,
entered into an agreement in 1971, which was to run until 1978. The
initial royalty of 6 percent of sales declined to 5 percent, then to 4
percent when sales reached an agreed level. The Mexican registry
refused to approve the contract at the negotiated rates, but did
agree to extend the contract term at a 3 percent rate for a sufficient
time so that the company's return remained the same, although the
payment period was extended. Because the Mexican officials
acknowledged the original agreement was the result of hard, fair
bargaining they allowed the return to remain at the agreed level.
144. Fund for Multinational Management Education, Council of the Americas, United
States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce & The George Washington Univer-
sity, Descriptive Materials, in 3 PUBLIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 109, 344 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as HosT CoUNTRY ENVIRONMENS).
145. Soberanis, Technology Transfer and Development, in TxcHNoLoG TRANSFER AND
DEVELOPMENTr 163, 168 (R. Driscoll & H. Wallender, HI eds. 1975).
146. HOST COUNTRY ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 144, at 341.
147. Id. at 342.
148. Id.
149. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
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The company accepted the new terms because it recognized Mex-
ico's desire to set uniform royalties for particular types of technol-
ogy. 15
0
2) A pharmaceutical company, although favorably disposed,
did not invest in Mexico because of the limit on royalties. In its
worldwide licensing program it was able to get a royalty of 8 percent
for the same process. The company could not take 8 percent from
the European licensor and only 3 to 4 percent from Mexico, so it
stayed out of Mexico altogether.'
3) When the Mexican government insisted that a fairly negoti-
ated royalty rate, satisfactory to both parties, be reduced, the trans-
feror decided that its services were being undervalued. The fact that
the contract required continuing technological assistance for which
the new law did not permit adequate time to reasonably compensate
the transferor, the need for improvements in the recipient's existing
facilities, combined with the forced royalty reduction, led the com-
pany to conclude that it was doubtful that it would transfer other
technology into Mexico if forced to comply with the new law.
52
The new law recognizes that Mexican licensees must pay some
of the costs of research and development. However, the govern-
ment's wishes to have "R&D efforts generated in Mexico"' 53 have
led to costly adaptations for which Mexico is reluctant to pay.
Mexico is being selective in an effort "to assess the value of a
particular technology" before registering the contract.25 When a
licensee is Mexican managed and controlled, the new law demands
unreasonable guarantees on performance of equipment over which
suppliers have no control.'" Suppliers who merely train and lend
experience to the equipment purchasers should not be held liable for
plant operation failures due to actions of the licensee operators.
4) The requirement that transferors allow unlimited, uncom-
pensated use of the imported technology is viewed by business as
an unreasonable interference with property rights. One company's
response to this was a refusal to transfer further technology to any
company which used it in areas other than those provided for in the
original contract. 50 Restrictions on use protect the markets of the
150. HOST CouNmry ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 144, at 347-48.
151. Id. at 349-50.
152. Id.
153. Aguilar, supra note 124, at 151.
154. Id. at 148.
155. HOST CouNTRY ENWRONMENTS, supra note 144, at 153.
156. Id. at 153-54.
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supplier, as well as a recipient of the technology, from cross-
competition by other licensees exceeding the scope of their licenses.
Clearly, the host will experience a decline in technology transfers if
it pursues a policy of using technology for any purpose it chooses,
as though it had purchased that technology outright, rather than
merely obtaining a license for a price based on the one use only.
5) A United States chemical company, which was in the process
of transfering "Nylon 6" tire yarn manufacturing technology, had
reached an agreement which became subject to mandatory revision
when the new Mexican law was implemented. The company indi-
cated that if the required changes in the contract had occurred prior
to completion of the transfer of much of the technology, it would not
have invested in Mexico. ""
6) Another United States chemical company found that its li-
censee failed to honor even the revised contract, which had been
approved for registration after the new law became effective. The
agreement was thereafter terminated. The licensee is believed to be
using the technology and the licensor fears that its technology will
be disclosed to others. If the constraints of the new law had been in
effect in 1969, when it entered into the contract, this company states
that it would have invested elsewhere.1"
7) A plastics binding firm has been transferring technology into
Mexico for more than twenty years, thereby creating a steady
stream of jobs, wages and profit-sharing, taxes, and technical train-
ing and know-how, all of which has resulted in a reduction in im-
ports and an increase in exports. This has clearly been beneficial for
Mexico. The company's expectation of a continued "reasonable re-
turn on its investment" has not materialized.'5 Recently it has been
questioning the advisability of continuing its operations in Mexico.
It is facing divestiture of 51 percent of its ownership and the loss of
control over exports. Under these circumstances, it states that "it
is highly unlikely that the transfer of new and more sophisticated
technology will occur in the future.""6
157. Id. at 340-42.
158. Id. at 343-44.
159. Fund for Multinational Management Education, Council of the Americas, United
States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce & The George Washington Univer-
sity, Descriptive Materials, in 2 PULUC POUCY AND TEcHNoLoGY TRANsvs 137, 418 (1978).
160. Id. at 420.
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C. Brazil
Countries throughout Latin America limit reimbursement from
a subsidiary to a parent corporation. Under the Brazilian limits,
which are particularly restrictive, the costs of supplying technical
expertise may not be reimbursed by the licensee.'
Brazil imposes mandatory time limits on technology transfer
contracts. This creates special problems where the transfer of know-
how and new technology must be ongoing. There is no compensation
permitted for assistance furnished after the time limit has passed
under the Code of Industrial Property. 62
Brazil does not follow the Paris Convention, nor does it provide
adequate patent or trademark protection for transferred technol-
ogy.'3 The major provisions of Brazil's Industrial Code are:
1) No patents can be obtained for chemicals, food, drugs, al-
loys, or the processes for making food and drugs.'"
2) No restrictions are permitted "on imports required in the
process or the manufacture of the product involved."' 65
3) The term for patents is fifteen years from date of filing; for
industrial models, the term is ten years; all patents and processes
must be translated into Portuguese within 180 days after filing in
Brazil.'"
4) The restrictions on trademarks are similar to those on pat-
ents; any distinction in mark permits the use of that mark on prod-
ucts similar to those covered by the original trademark.6 7
5) Compulsory licenses will be granted if patents are unused for
three years.'6
6) Royalties are limited to 1 to 5 percent. 6'
7) Royalties for trademarks are limited to 1 percent.7 0
8) Companies are permitted to remit up to 12 percent of capital,
161. HosT CouTRmY ENvIRoNMErT, supra note 144, at 157-58.
162. Borzutsky, Analysis of the Industrial Property Code, in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND
DaEVLOpMENT 226, 227-28 (R. Driscoll & H. Wallender, IMl eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Industrial Property Code].
163. Id. at 226.
164. Id.
165. Carneiro, Technical Progress and Transfer of Technology Problems as seen from
Brazil Today, in TECHNOLOGY TRANsFER AND DavEmOPMarr 230, 243 (R. Driscoll & H. Wal-
lender, III eds. 1975).
166. Because the translation process is expensive, it is viewed by many as unreasonable
and may be negotiable. Industrial Property Code, supra note 162, at 226.
167. In practical terms there is no protection for trademarks. Id. at 225.
168. Id. at 227.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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with payments for technical assistance limited to 1 to 5 percent of
sales.' 7
9) There is a 25 percent tax imposed on base profits which
escalates as profits increase.
72
10) Royalties from subsidiary to parent are treated as dividends
for tax purposes.'
11) "Fees for technical assistance must be paid each time the
assistance is obtained" and cannot be contracted or paid in a lump
sum. 174
12) Fees other than royalties are limited; they can only be paid
for five years by contract, but the payment agreement can be ex-
tended for another five years.
75
13) Contracts containing restrictions on marketing, including
export limitations, will not be registered.'76
The Brazilian Code is enforced by the National Institute of
Industrial Property (INPI), which must register all contracts involv-
ing technology transfers. 7 7 INPI is also a center for information for
domestic companies on problems of technology transfer.' 71 It aids
domestics in contract negotiations and sometimes supplies the ac-
tual negotiators as well. '71
The Brazilian Code's original aim of import substitution has
recently been changed. The country's new goal is to become an
exporter18 The stated objective of INPI is to attract foreign invest-
ment and to promote domestic research and development through
a system of incentives.' 8' The ultimate objective is to strengthen the
scientific-technological base within the country. 82
The Code recognizes the need to reduce abuses, such as avoid-
ance of taxes, and to alter the balance of payments.'1 Avoidance of
trademarks as a form of market control is felt to be more important
than patent regulation.1u
171. Carneiro, supra note 165, at 243.
172. Id.
173. Industrial Property Code, supra note 162, at 227.
174. Id. at 227-28.
175. Id. at 228.
176. Carneiro, supra note 165, at 243.
177. Industrial Property Code, supra note 162, at 228.
178. Carneiro, supra note 165, at 240.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 234.
181. Industrial Property Code, supra note 162, at 228.
182. Carneiro, supra note 165, at 239.
183. Industrial Property Code, supra note 162, at 229.
184. Id. Market control describes a situation wherein the licensor uses the licensee to
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Brazil has studied the world technological and economic scene
in preparation for integrating itself into the world marketplace as
an exporter. '" Brazil recognizes that foreign capital is essential to
the growth of its industrial sector.86 There are indications that the
Brazilian ideologically based regulation and control of payments for
technology is becoming more pragmatic.18
Attempts have been made to stimulate domestic research and
development through government funding and loans to both private
research and research facilities at the University of Sao Paulo. ' For
example, the government has loaned an engineering firm $3 million
for fifteen years at 4 percent interest.' 8' Three new companies to
fund technology development have been created.'" Brazil is seeking
more sophisticated technology."' Therefoe, it is asking, "What is
the technology we are buying?" and "How good is it?""'
The new law, as written, is very strict, but signs of flexibility
were apparent in a question-and-answer period that followed intro-
duction of the legislation,"3 and in special legislation under which
whole factories may be imported without being subjected to taxa-
tion.' The United States, though, views the INPI staff as techni-
cally incompetent and, therefore, unable to properly evaluate tech-
nology."
Some case histories of companies conducting business within
Brazil follow.
1) An engineering company was asked to submit a bid for a
project. The extensive engineering required would have amounted
to at least 40 percent of the project's cost. Because engineering
services had to be performed outside Brazil, the Brazilian tax on 25
percent of payments going outside the country applied. This raised
create a market until the contract term expires. The licensor then refuses to renew the
contract and imports his product to fill the demand of the created market.
185. Carneiro, supra note 165, at 233.
186. Id. at 234.
187. Id. at 232.
188. These governmental funds are channeled through the government owned company,
Finep. Id. at 233.
189. Id. at 236.
190. These companies are Embramec for engineering; Fibase (Financimento do Isumos
Basicos) for development of raw materials, particularly ferrous material and fertilizers; and
Investbras, an investment company. Id. at 237.
191. Id. at 238.
192. Id. at 239.
193. Industrial Property Code, supra note 162, at 245-50.
194. HosT CoU NrRY ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 144, at 319.
195. Id. at 317.
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the company's bid above that of companies in countries with non-
tax treaties with Brazil. Therefore, the company was underbid for
the contract.1"
2) An aluminum extruder earning 20 percent royalty elsewhere
was willing to accept 5 percent if costs of technology could be ap-
plied as capital to their investment in a joint venture. INPI would
not approve the contract. Red tape and the inability to capitalize
technology costs led the company to abandon its attempt to transfer
the technology.
97
3) A consulting company was told by Central Bank"8 and INPI
that its contract would probably be approved. In reliance, it went
ahead on the contract, but after two years the approval had still
been withheld. As a result, the company was forced to pull out and
was left with a large amount of non-repatriable cruzeiros. This
company will not do business with Brazil again.'"
4) A manufacturer was induced to come to Brazil by a company
which, thereafter, changed its internal rules so that it could no
longer buy from foreign-owned companies. The manufacturer was
thus faced with a virtual expropriation or with forced entry into a
joint venture whereby it would supply all of its technology and
know-how to a competitor. The company chose to abandon the pro-
ject." O
5) A chemical company with past dealings and a good working
relationship with the recipient was never given payment approval,
although the Brazilian company was anxious to get the technology.
The licensee was able to arrange payment through a New York bank
and, therefore, the transfer went through without the approval of
the Brazilian government.20'
6) A petrochemical company made a proposal for the design of
a complex refining processing unit. The technology was primarily
confidential information. The research and development involved
was expensive; therefore, a twenty to twenty-five year confidential-
ity obligation was imposed on all licensees. Under Brazil's Norma-
tive Act 15,22 contracts requiring maintenance of confidentiality for
more than five years, with the possibility of one five-year renewal,
196. Id. at 319-20.
197. Id. at 320-21.
198. Id. at 321.
199. Id. at 322.
200. Id. at 323.
201. Id. at 313-14.
202. Id. at 325.
19791
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Ann.
are prohibited. As a result of this time limitation, obligations of
confidentiality which the transferor owes to other licensees, and the
likelihood that the information will be valuable for more than the
ten years allowed, the company is considering withdrawing its pro-
posal.2
7) A United States chemical company which transferred tech-
nology to its wholly owned subsidiary in Brazil cited "[djelays in
the registration process [as] one of the greatest sources of frustra-
tion for foreign companies transferring technology to Brazil.''2
8) The Normative Act 15 prohibition against restrictions on
technology exportation would have created a problem for another
United States chemical company which limited its subsidiary's use
of transferred technology to plants already in operation if the sub-
sidiary had not been owned by the transferor. The company decided
to comply with the Normative Act but has nevertheless been unable
to get approval of its contracts.20 There are, however, encouraging
signs that Brazil may ease restrictions on technology transfer ar-
rangements.20
D. India
Foreign industry reaction to India's demands for trade secrets
and divestiture of ownership, in exchange for the right to continue
operations there, has been decidedly negative in two notable instan-
ces:
Coca-Cola's secret formula for syrup was demanded as the price
of continuing to do business in India. In view of the widespread use
of Coca-Cola, the number of licensees with whom Coca-Cola had
confidentiality obligations, and the lack of any social or public wel-
fare justification, the demand was clearly unreasonable. Coca-Cola
stood to lose its entire world market if, having complied with the
Indian disclosure requirement, the Indian bottlers had disclosed the
formula to Coca-Cola competitors. As of November 1977, the dis-
pute between Coca-Cola and the Indian government had been unre-
solved.2
IBM chose to leave India rather than divest itself of sufficient
ownership and control to comply with the Indian requirement "that
203. Id. at 326-27.
204. Id. at 331.
205. Id. at 331-33.
206. Id. at 341.
207. Wall St. J., Nov. 16, 1977, at 48, col. 1.
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unless a foreign company is substantially employed in export or in
sophisticated technology it can't hold more than 40 percent of the
equity in any Indian operation."" 8
In contrast to the Coca-Cola and IBM examples, the Nestle
Company is continuing its substantial Indian operations. India has
profited in terms of employment, increased revenues from taxes,
training of technical and other personnel, reduction in imports and
the creation of products for export through the vast investments of
the Nestle Company. Nestle set up an entire dairy industry and
successfully created an acceptable product by canning and process-
ing buffalo milk. In order to set up its canning center, it was neces-
sary to train regional farmers in the proper care of dairy buffalo and
irrigation methods. In addition, Nestle supplied food supplements
for the cattle, fertilizer for the growing of feed, trained field paravet-
erinarians to care for the animals, and trained technicians and
workers to man and manage the canning facilities. Through Nestl6's
investments, there has been a change in lifestyle and culture, a
tremendous improvement in the standard of living for farmers, their
families, and factory personnel, and the creation of a continuing
supply of quality milk for domestic as well as export purposes.20
DIsCUSSION AND REcOMMENDATIONS
A. Past Recommendations
"[EJxisting theories and policies place more emphasis on re-
shaping the activities of the supplier than on ways for the user
country to improve its ability to utilize technology" which it is
acquiring.210 Perhaps the major contribution of the conferences on
revision of international laws and policies has been the increased
communication between the developed world and the LDCs and the
realization that simplistic solutions are not the answer to increased
industrialization of the Third World.
Recommendations for revisions of agreements dealing with in-
tellectual property rights and for implementation of national laws
to control imported technology within the Third World countries
and regional pact areas will be limited in their impact by the reac-
tion of businesses and governments of the countries supplying the
technology.2"
208. Id.
209. See generally NESTl IN THE DEVELOPMENT COUNTIES 184-215 (Nest6 Alimentana
pub. 1975).
210. Wallender, III, supra note 15, at 68.
211. See notes 137-61, 197-209 supra and accompanying text.
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The international conferences, which have centered on general-
ities, have produced few practical suggestions for increasing tech-
nology flow."' One suggestion, mentioned in several publications, is
the formation of technology centers to store data on available tech-
nology, possible investors and suppliers of technology, and national
needs of LDCs. 1 Representatives of companies or nations seeking
technology could evaluate available technology for solving particu-
lar problems in terms of value, costs and appropriateness, rather
than waiting for potential investors to offer a package of know-how
which may or may not fit into a rational scheme of industrial
growth.
Technology data centers could also supply information about
the host's environment, laws and industrial goals to assist potential
investors in determining whether their technology was suitable or
adaptable for transfer to that nation.
Most of the discussions concerning technology centers have
been brief. They appear to be concerned with importation of large,
rather than small and intermediate sized industry which could ar-
guably be of greatest benefit in the development of an infrastructure
within the Third World. "Today, the multinational enterprise pro-
vides such an easy and effective source of technology that it may
discourage developing countries from investing in the long-term
development of their own universities, laboratories and other poten-
tial national suppliers of technology.""'
Law revision and the dissemination of information are impor-
tant aids to the continued transfer of technology, but by themselves
do not contribute to the actual transfer of any technology.
The recommendations for law revisions and technology centers
are intriguing, but do not deal directly with the practical side of all
technology transfers. Namely, the recommendations do not deal
with the recipient's ability to absorb the technology,2 15 the use and
adaptation of the technology as required by the marketplace, 26 the
technological infrastructure, 27 the supply of skilled labor, 218 or the
cultural, political, and legal environments of the importing na-
tion.219
212. TECHNOLOGY TaNSimsR, supra note 4, at 297.
213. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
214. Wallender, III, supra note 15, at 69.
215. Hoelscher & Hummon, supra note 16, at 80.
216. Holland, Developing Country Incentives and Constraints of Technology Transfer
and Development, in 3 PUtUC POUCY AND TEcHNOLooY TRANsmR 43, 50 (1978).
217. Id. at 52.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 51.
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B. An Expansion of the Recommendations
The technology center recommendation is being implemented
in several countries. One possible expanded model for a center is
Western Electric's Research and Development Center, which has
been operating for some years within its corporate structure.2 0 It is
staffed with trained scientists and engineers who develop new
products and processes. During development they bring in
"customers"-in this case, engineers from their factories who will
be putting the new products into production. The field engineers
work with the. R&D personnel throughout the development of the
new production system. This normally requires about two years.
They are on hand to give direct input during the planning stages,
to supply information about the conditions at their facility, and to
control the direction of development so that they will be able to
better implement the system at their facility. In this way, problems
which might arise at the site are often prevented.Y'
This system leads to a product which the engineers from the
field can easily produce, allows for trouble shooting along the way,
but perhaps most important, builds a cooperative working relation-
ship which is invaluable when the system is in operation. The un-
derstanding of the needs and difficulties of each party facilitates the
continuing transfer of technology and assistance, which is often es-
sential to continued productivity.m
A system analogous to Western Electric's could be imple-
mented whenever technology is to be transferred. If the representa-
tives of the recipient were to work within the transferor's R&D pro-
gram in order to adapt the technology to their market and environ-
ment, the appropriateness of the technology and the success of the
operation would be greatly enhanced.
In the Conclusion of the text Technology Transfer and Develop-
ment: An Historical and Geographical Perspective, the suggestion
is made that "a training center with the participation of host and
home governments as well as multi-national corporations" be devel-
oped. 3 "The training programs should be in the application of spe-
cific types of know-how for the utilization of new technology," which
might eventually develop into a full-fledged research and develop-
220. Sagal, Effective Technology Transfer - From Laboratory to Production Line, 1 J.
TEcH. TRANSm 7, 7 (1977).
221. Id. at 8.
222. Id. at 10.
223. TECHNoLoGY TRANsFER, supra note 4, at 300.
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ment center."4
"No overall policy will fit the multiple situations that exist
among the various sectors." This results from the great differences
in manufacturing technology from industry to industry, and the
numerous means of transfer. Many of the past recommendations
have been concerned solely with the MNC as the transferor of tech-
nology and with the developed world as the source of that technol-
ogy. " 6 As the size and complexity of an organization transferring or
implementing technology increases, the efficient use of industrial
technology requires that expertise be expanded to include
"engineering, marketing, sales, finance, accounting, data process-
ing, legal, personnel, corporate relations, quality control, mainte-
nance" and other areas.m Should the LDC refuse to allow the trans-
feror continuing control over the operation, the recipient must be
capable of supervising and managing all of these diverse matters.
The MNC is already cognizant of, and prepared to deal with, these
diverse aspects of international industrial trade and is, therefore,
better able to properly manage the enterprise than the LDC. Per-
haps for this reason alone, the LDCs should revise their policies to
allow MNCs continuing control of imported large-scale technology,
and to permit adequately compensated technological assistance
contracts.
The MNC is rarely capable of dealing with "socio-psychological
factors."2' Successful transfer of technology may be impossible due
to the "failure of source-nation representatives to understand fully
the societal implications, overtones and interactions of a specific
new and alien technology introduced into an economy seeking rapid
changes." The study by LDCs of internal societal factors and the
education of MNC transferors to deal with them, would reduce the
possibility of failure due to the cultural impact of the technology.
224. Id.
225. Fund for Multinational Management Education, Council of the Americas, United
States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce & The George Washington Univer-
sity, Issug IV Summary: Characteristics and Potential Innovations of U.S. Industry, in 2
PUBLIc PoucY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANsFER 11, 14 (1978).
226. It has been suggested that "Intermediate [appropriate] Technology," which
"usually refers to scaled-down, labor-intensive processes that make maximum use of local
resources," be promoted. "Appropriate Technology'" supra note 32, at 19.
The transfer of technology from LDC to LDC is also being promoted. India is already
"building on its base of technology expertise by exporting know-how to other LDCs." Id. at
22.
227. Hoelscher & Hummon, supra note 16, at 80.
228. Id. at 81.
229. Id. at 82.
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Technology is political and cultural in its origins and in its
impact upon the nation to which it is transferred. 0 The user must
be able to absorb the technology transferred.?' Absorption requires
"suitable interactions between the new technology and societal
structures . . . and value systems, attitudes toward change and
activity patterns" 32 of the host. In addition, absorption of large-
scale technology requires that the recipient have, or create, a scien-
tific and technical infrastructure capable of supporting that indus-
try locally. 3 3 Large industry within the developed world relies on
small industry for numerous components and supplies which are not
producedwithin the corporation. The sources of supply vary in size
from other MNCs to one-man shops producing a single item re-
quired by the MNC.2' Without an indigenous technical infrastruc-
ture, the LDC recipient must rely on the transferor or other foreign
suppliers to maintain large-scale imported industries?0
Developing nations sincerely desiring to industrialize should
realize that the growth of an infrastructure sufficient to support
current technology, and to allow participation in the development
and sales of future technology, ultimately requires the development
of a technological middle-class of skilled, small and medium-sized
business operators.m Countries which discourage the importation
or growth of small businesses through overly restrictive labor laws,
technology regulations, and unreasonable limits on investment
return or on patent and other protections are actively slowing their
own entry into the ranks of producers of technology capable of
commanding a fair share of the international market? 7
"Recently, some developing countries have begun to relax their
regulations on technology transfer and foreign investment. 1'' The
230. Id. at 80. See INDUSTRY CHARACEMISTICS, supra note 4, at 7.
231. Luc Benoit, supra note 53.
232. Hoelscher & Hummon, supra note 16, at 80.
233. INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 4, at 7.
234. Interview with Raymond Bogucki, patent attorney for Fraser & Bogucki, in Los
Angeles, California (Jan. 12, 1978).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Although small-scale technology is already being used extensively by entrepreneurs
throughout the developed world, the know-how involved is unlikely to be included in data
banks or technical literature because there is no system of recording it. Interview with Ray-
mond Bogucki, supra note 234. The Netherlands has proposed stimulation of the transfer of
small-scale technology through an "International Mechanism for Appropriate Technology,"
which is "an organization that would coordinate and promote this type of technology through
an international network of government and volunteer agencies." "Appropriate Technology",
supra note 32, at 22.
238. Holland, supra note 216, at 45.
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easing of restrictions results from the recognition "that the flows of
technology. . . may have been decreasing because of their restric-
tive laws and policies . . . ."2 These countries should also recog-
nize the need to encourage indigenous innovation. They should un-
dertake the study and implementation of domestic systems of assis-
tance and incentives designed to stimulate the inventiveness of their
nationals.
Although the fundamental requirements for stimulating the
inventive mind are not known and should be studied, it has been
learned that from 50 to 80 percent of the notably striking inventions
are produced by inventors from small-scale environments.2 0 This
figure of 80 percent may be produced by only 5 percent of the funds
expended for research and development. 2" In an article in the WIPO
Colombo Symposium, Zachariassen lists a number of studies of
inventiveness conducted during the last twenty years. 2 He con-
cludes that "in several major industrial fields the main initiative
has come from independent inventors and smaller industrial firms,
and in the latter case the inventor has quite often been the
entrepreneur-manager himself."
'2"
Most contributions of larger companies are merely refinements
of inventions by independents.'" Therefore, LDCs seeking to de-
velop their own indigenous industries must realize that indepen-
dent, small-scale inventors provide the major source of significant
inventions. The characteristics and attitudes which are socially and
culturally supportive of the innovative spirit must be studied and
encouraged in order for these countries to develop their own inven-
tiveness.
C. Proposals for the Stimulation of Technical Infrastructures
within LDCs
1) LDC governments should actively seek out small technical
business operators within other countries. They can encourage the
importation of small-scale technology by providing tax incentives,
adequate protection and payment for the technology provided, as-
239. Id.
240. Zachariassen, Encouragement of Inventiveness and Innovation in Developing
Countries, WIPO WoRD S oswnm ON THE IMPoirNcE OF THE PATENT Svsr 'w DEVELOPiNG
COUNTRIES 237, 238 (1977).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 238-39.
243. Id. at 238.
244. Id. at 238-39.
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sistance in entering the market within the LDC, assistance in deal-
ing with "red tape," simplification of processes and registration
requirements incident to the transfer, help in securing labor and raw
materials or supplies, supplying cultural and social data and any
other governmental actions which will assist the small entrepreneur
in entering into production within the LDC.
2) Domestic, small-scale research and development can be
encouraged by providing incentives to locals to develop and pro-
duce products involving technical innovation. Governmental ob-
stacles to entering and maintaining a place within the domestic or
export marketplace should be removed.'"
3) Data centers dispensing information to domestic inventors
should be established in order to assist domestic inventors in the
analysis of problems and to supply information about available sol-
utions."' Universities and existing data centers could be included in
this network of information and support.
4) Financial assistance should be provided for the development
and manufacture for market of newly invented products and pro-
cesses.
1 7
5) Apprenticeships should be established, and LDC nationals
should be encouraged and assisted in obtaining work in small busi-
nesses in developed countries. There they can participate in all
phases of the production process and lean first-hand how to set up
and maintain small businesses. An entrepreneur must not only have
a process or invention, but must be able to produce, market, obtain
supplies, adapt, change and refine production methods, and comply
with business and labor laws. One must also maintain quality con-
trol, establish a reputation of reliability with customers, manage
personnel, and continue to develop new products.
The characteristics essential to 'the entrepreneurial success
have not been studied extensively. 4 ' LDCs should therefore initiate
comprehensive studies of the entrepreneurial personality in order to
encourage its development within their populations. Cultural bar-
riers to these characteristics may be slow to change.
245. Id. at 237-45.
246. Id. at 241. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
247. Zachariassen, supra note 240, at 243.
248. See generally D. CoLuNs & D. MOORE, THE ORGAMZATON MAKERS (1970); J. DECKS,
THE SMALL FIRM OWNER-MANAGER (1976); F. DERossi, THE MzXCAN ENTREPRENEUR (1971);
ENTREPRENEURSHP AND ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT (J. Schreiver ed. 1975); INTERNATIONAL SYM-
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CONCLUSION
The conflict between the LDCs goal of attaining technical inde-
pendence and the internal conditions which limit or prevent their
achievement of this goal cannot be resolved by simply revising the
international legal system, although some legislative reforms may
be beneficial. The transfer of technology and its utilization require
the development of a technical infrastructure capable of generating
innovation and supporting heavy industry. In order to stimulate the
growth of an adequate infrastructure and to encourage domestic
invention and development, the LDC must fully understand its own
cultural, societal and legal structures and their interactions and
effects on imported technology, and must establish internal support
systems consistent with the social system to assist entrepreneurs,
inventors and small technical businesses.
Spring Bright
